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Abstract 
 
This article explores the European Union¶s (EU) practices of international state recognition in 
a transitional international order. It illustrates the difficulties that the EU has encountered in 
attempting to reach a collective position on sensitive cases of recognition ± through a 
complex balance of internal and external considerations ± at a time when the norms regarding 
recognition are increasingly under challenge. Whether the organisation takes a collective 
European position on recognition or allows its members to adopt individual national 
positions, acute inconsistencies and tensions have been exposed, with implications for the 
EU¶s standing in the world. Through this, the article identifies a key tension between the 
EU¶s normative commitments and its geopolitical interests. In conclusion, the article argues 
that whilst a uniform EU policy on recognition may not be feasible and case-by-case 
pragmatism will likely continue, a more coherent approach and greater understanding of the 
impact of the EU¶s position on recognition are necessary. The paper draws upon interview 
material and extensive analysis of official EU documentation in order to provide new insights 
into this complex challenge. By exploring the intricacies of recognition politics, the paper 
also makes an empirical contribution to understanding the practice of international relations 
in this area. 
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Introduction 
 
The international recognition of new states is loaded with political and legal controversies, 
and it lacks a rigorous normative framework. Although the material requirements of 
sovereign statehood have, in principle, reflected general agreement since the first half of the 
20th Century, the practice of international recognition has often been ad hoc, sui generis, and 
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highly political.3 In particular, where legal sovereignty is contested, the politics of 
international recognition are controversial and can have far-reaching implications for peace 
and security. An underexplored question is whether and how the membership of states in 
regional and international organisations shapes foreign policies and practices of state 
recognition. Whilst international recognition is an exclusive prerogative of sovereign states, 
international and regional organisations play a significant role in this process, which is a 
reflection of their evolving capacity as well as an evolution in the political dynamics of 
international recognition.  
 
This article explores the EU¶s engagement with the politics of international recognition, as a 
key example of the impact of regional organisations in this area. Depending on the case, this 
engagement has involved a collective position on recognition or non-recognition, or a 
decision to allow individual EU members to adopt independent national positions. Our 
overarching argument is that the EU¶s practice of state recognition is based on a complex 
balance between internal and external considerations which expose tensions between the 
EU¶s constitutive principles and the geopolitical realities it faces. A number of themes 
provide the focus for analysis. Firstly, the EU is stuck between a normative commitment to 
recognition based upon remedial secession ± in cases where there is a strong humanitarian or 
democratic case for statehood ± and a political environment in which this normative 
commitment may be contrary to its material interests. This is highlighted in cases in the 
former Soviet space, and to some extent Taiwan, where the EU has sought, with only limited 
success, to balance its normative commitments and its geopolitical, including economic, 
interests. At a time when cases of international recognition are increasingly partisan in the 
context of global geopolitical rivalries, the EU¶s approach is particularly sensitive. This 
challenges the idea that Europe has an inherent capacity to draw upon its µnormative power¶ 
to influence international behavior,4 because this kind of authority rests upon a certain level 
of normative coherence as well as consistency of action. 
 
Secondly, the EU¶s approach to recognition also points to a tension between its commitment 
to promote human rights and engage with communities (especially in its neighbourhood and 
near abroad), and its commitment to international order based upon territorial integrity. 
Whilst the EU¶s normative values in principle place it on the side of the µpeople¶, it is 
difficult to engage with breakaway regions such as South Ossetia, Crimea and Abkhazia 
without generating controversy ± or even exacerbating conflict ± which in turn exposes an 
internal contradiction in the EU¶s approach to such situations. Therefore, where there is a 
tension between the will of the people (for separation) and existing borders, the EU¶s 
normative position can be problematised. A pragmatic policy of µengagement without 
recognition¶ has provided a way to avoid some of the sensitivities, but we will argue that this 
has not addressed the tensions which exist. 
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Thirdly, a further issue which makes the EU¶s approach to recognition a pressing topic ± both 
in terms of specific cases and its broader practice ± concerns the international norms which 
are relevant to recognition. The international system is generally reluctant to grant statehood, 
especially in contested cases. However, there has arguably been a shift in international norms 
from the limited 1933 Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood, towards a greater 
emphasis upon human rights, democracy, minority rights, and thus a shift towards 
recognizing remedial secession. The EU, as an organisation committed to liberal norms, is 
again contested since it must reconcile the importance of international order alongside its 
normative principles and it interests. Simultaneously, powerful states ± such as the US, China 
and Russia ± often take opposing sides on recognition conflicts, resulting in a number of new 
states which enjoy only partial membership of international society. International recognition 
thus appears to be increasingly about politics rather than law; according to Ryngaert and 
SoEULH WKH UXOHVJRYHUQLQJ WKHSURFHVVRI VWDWH UHFRJQLWLRQDUH LQ³H[LVWHQWLDO FULVLV´GXH WR
WKHLU³XQFHUWDLQW\DQGLQFRKHUHQFH´5 As the EU engages with the world more ± in particular 
following the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service ± it is 
increasingly engaged with de facto or unrecognized states and claims for statehood. This 
further problematizes the position of the EU since it exposes its decisions on recognition to 
greater international controversy. 
 
Exploring a wide range of practices, we find that the EU¶s collective stance on the 
recognition of new states has far-reaching implications for its internal cohesion and external 
impact. In general, this stance is not based on principled norms, but rather it reflects a less 
pre-determined process that is shaped by multiple factors and interests which are often in 
tension. Moreover, when a collective position has been adopted by the EU it has often been 
controversial ± such as in the former Yugoslavia ± or raised tensions with powerful third 
parties, such as Russia in connection with eastern Ukraine. Whilst the EU¶s pragmatic, case-
by-case approach seems sensible it has not enabled the EU to avoid a number of tensions and 
inconsistencies which have problematized its relationship with important external partners, 
and potentially undermined the EU¶s own normative credibility. 
 
These debates raise a number of inter-linked questions which will be considered in this 
article. How has the EU¶s practice of state recognition evolved, what factors have shaped it, 
and what patterns have emerged from this practice? How significant are the recognition 
policies of supranational bodies such as the EU in steering the preferences and decisions of 
their members? What has determined when the EU has taken a collective position on the 
recognition of a new state entity, and when it has allowed EU members to make a unilateral 
decision on recognition? Can the EU approach international recognition in a manner which 
reconciles human rights concerns, remedial claims, and international stability in a coherent 
way? 
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This article contributes to the literature on state recognition by providing both a conceptual 
and empirical discussion of the role of regional organisations in shaping international 
recognition politics, a neglected but important topic. It gives particular attention to the 
challenges encountered by the EU as it engages with international recognition, focusing on 
specific practices. The next two sections explore the role of the EU in the evolving dynamics 
of international recognition, providing a framework for understanding how the EU forms its 
recognition policies. The following section analyses the different patterns of EU practice 
since the early 1990s, which are collective recognition, collective non-recognition, and the 
practice of allowing EU members to form their own position. In so doing, the discussion 
demonstrates how these practices generate the controversies introduced above, providing a 
substantive illustration of the tension between normative principles and geopolitical realities, 
made more acute in a transitional international order. Finally, the conclusion provides an 
analysis of the broader implications of the EU¶s practices in this area. The research for this 
paper draws upon interview data gathered in Brussels, in addition to official EU sources. 
 
Regional organisations and state recognition 
 
Decades of debate have not resolved deep divisions between scholars, practitioners and 
lawyers on who has the right to recognise new states and under what circumstances new 
states gain diplomatic recognition.6 This is because the recognition of states ± a prerogative 
held only by other states ± remains one of the most unregulated and de-centralised aspects of 
international relations.7 The most prominent debate is between those scholars who argue that 
recognition is a constitutive element and essential precondition of independent statehood,8 
and those scholars who see the emergence and existence of sovereign statehood independent 
of recognition by the other states.9 In practice, although legal doctrine governs the 
conferment of statehood and the interactions of states, the process by which some entities 
become recognised as states and others do not is largely political. There is no regime which 
can objectively rule on the criteria for international recognition and less so enforce a duty to 
recognise new states.10 As DuJDUGPDLQWDLQV³[r]ecognition is still characterized by political 
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arbitrariness´DQGVtates do not accept a duty to recognize new states.11 Ryngaert and Sobrie 
WKXV DUJXH WKDW ³WKH ODFNRI D FOHDU-cut normative framework gives way to uncertainty and 
LQFRKHUHQWSROLFLHV´12 
 
There were early attempts by several UN member states to delegate their right of recognition 
to UN bodies, in order to regulate and centralize the process. Lauterpacht argued that the 
collective coordination of state recognition would avoid controversial and unilateral 
interpretations of the principles and rules dictating the recognition of states and strengthen the 
global legal order.13 According to this, collective recognition would resolve the issue of 
partial recognition and thus avoid state contestation, it would remove dilemmas among states 
where there are rival claims, and it would overcome the difficulty of forming a judgement on 
the availability of facts. More recently, Dugard has called for the formation of normative 
guidelines that would HQDEOH LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV ³WR UHDFK IDLU GHFLVLRQV RQ WKH
VWDWHKRRGRIVHFHGLQJHQWLWLHVZLWKLQDFRKHUHQWOHJDOIUDPHZRUN´14 However, a centralized, 
regulated regime for deciding on recognition decisions has never found much support 
amongst states DQG LW LV JHQHUDOO\ DJUHHG WKDW ³LW LV WKH QDWLRQDO SUDFWLFH ZKLFK ZLOO EH RI
SULPDU\ LPSRUWDQFHZKHQ LW FRPHV WR WKHPHFKDQLVPVDQGSURFHGXUHVRI UHFRJQLWLRQ´15 In 
this context, the politics of diplomatic recognition predominantly involve legal, normative, 
and geopolitical considerations in granting or withholding recognition of new states. 
 
Traditionally, diplomatic recognition of new states is granted by existing sovereign states, but 
with the rise of regional organisations and supranational bodies new practices of state 
recognition are emerging which provide new grounds for understanding the changing nature 
of state recognition.16 Admission to international organisations, for example, represents one 
form of regulation. It is widely accepted that ³DGPLVVLRQ WR IXOO 81 PHPEHUVKLS LV
WDQWDPRXQWWRFROOHFWLYHGHMXUHUHFRJQLWLRQ´ which is ³likely to facilitate the entry of the new 
VWDWHLQWRRWKHUPXOWLODWHUDO2UJDQL]DWLRQV´.17 Inverting this, the deliberate exclusion of a state 
                                                 
11
 John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Ltd, 
1987), p. 9. 
12
 Cedric Ryngaert and Sven Sobrie, µRecognition of States: International Law or 
Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and 
Abkhazia¶, Leiden Journal of International Law, 24: 2 (2011), p. 484. 
13
 Lauterpacht (1947), p. 168. See also M. J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments: Legal 
Doctrine and State Practice, 1815-1995 (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 51. 
14
 Dugard (2013), p. 33 
15
 Grant (2015), p. 194. See also David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 42. 
16
 John Dugard, The Secession of States and Their Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo 
(Leiden, Brill, 2013), p. 35. 
17
 Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), p. 22. 
 6 
from UN membership amounts to collective non-recognition. Yet, other scholars dissociate 
membership of international organisations with de jure and de facto recognition of states.18 
 
In turn, while a great deal is known about the rules, roles and practices of the UN in the 
recognition of states,19 less is known about the practice of state recognition by regional 
organisations, such as the EU.20 Can regional organisations recognise states, and would this 
change the manner in which new states are admitted to international society? Buzan and 
Wæver demonstrate that a regional level of analysis provides a compelling focus for the 
interaction of sub-national, national, regional as well as global normative and political 
dynamics.21 Regional organisations have the capacity to form collective intentions, and thus 
act as legal subjects in international relations.22 Increasingly, regional organisations, as 
distinct entities in world politics, demonstrate not only the capacity to coordinate the actions 
of member states, including when and how to recognise states, but also make decisions which 
have legal and political consequences. This capacity helps to explain the constraining and 
enabling role of regional organisations in relation to their members¶ foreign policy conduct. 
A regional perspective provides a differentiated understanding of state recognition by 
capturing region-specific dynamics, and it demonstrates the co-existence of geopolitical and 
normative agendas, and divergent foreign policy interests. The EU is a key test of this, since 
it has in the past two decades sought to consolidate a common position on external and 
security matters. Other regional organisations, such as the Organisation of American States 
(OAS), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the African Union (AU) have also 
engaged on a case-by-case basis with the question of state recognition, largely by clarifying 
the discretionary character of recognition and shaping the decisions of their members on 
when to grant or withhold recognition.  
 
The outcomes of state recognition processes can range from collective recognition and non-
recognition to bilateral recognition. Collective recognition is the most effective method for 
entering international society as it reduces the burden of bilateral recognition as well as 
enhances the international legitimacy of new states.23 Collective non-recognition is grounded 
RQWKHFRQYLFWLRQWKDW³VWDWHVDUHXQGHUDQREOLJDWLRQQRWWRUHFRJQL]HWKURXJKLQGLYLGXDORU
collective acts, the purported statehood of an effective territorial entity created in violation of 
                                                 
18
 Hans Aufricht, µPrinciples and Practices of Recognition by International Organization¶, 
The American Journal of International Law, 43:4 (1949), p. 703. 
19
 John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 
1987).  
20
 Richard Caplan, Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
21
 Barry Buzan B and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International 
Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
22
 Toni Erskine, Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and 
International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
23
 James Ker-Lindsay, µEngagement Without Recognition: The Limits of Diplomatic 
Interaction with Contested States¶, International Affairs, 91: 2 (2015), p. 273-4. 
 7 
RQHRUPRUHIXQGDPHQWDOQRUPVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´ 24 Bilateral recognition signifies formal 
recognition of independence and sovereign statehood and it confers the legal personality 
necessary to share benefits and obligations of international law.25 
 
The EU has developed an elaborate practice of state recognition over the past two decades.26 
Membership in the EU by major powers such as the UK, Germany and France has gradually 
given the EU the status of a collective power with global influence, underpinning the 
importance of this practice.27 The fact that the EU has a structure in place for common 
decision-making on foreign matters signifies its capacity ± and perhaps a duty ± to respond 
collectively to claims for recognition by new states. Moreover, the diplomatic practice of the 
EU in the past two decades has demonstrated that regional organisations, as political 
assemblages of states, are establishing new practices of collective and individual recognition 
and non-recognition of states. Therefore, exploring the EU¶s practice of state recognition not 
only helps to shine light on the role of regional organisations in gatekeeping or enabling the 
expansion of the political cartography of states, but also provides a contribution to debate on 
the evolution of the EU¶s global role. 
 
In turn, the EU¶s practice of international recognition is interrelated with the idea of 
µnormative power¶ and Europe¶s capacity to shape norms related to a range of policy areas.28 
If the EU¶s constitutive principles generate legitimacy for its actions, in theory this should 
strengthen its role as a norm leader. According to this idea, these principles guide Europe¶s 
interaction with external partners, and represent a standard of practice to aspire to for those 
who wish to do business with Europe. If Europe is inherently normative as a function of its 
constitutive principles, the key question is whether the EU has the µability to shape 
FRQFHSWLRQV RI WKH ³QRUPDO´ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV¶ in relation to recognition.29 The 
µNormative Power Europe¶ idea has been widely critiqued,30 and international recognition 
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practices present a further challenge. In particular, the authority of EU practices is 
conditioned by the coherence and consistency of its action ± which is challenged by the 
geopolitical tensions that are at the heart of this policy area. In addition, the legitimacy of its 
decisions will be conditioned by the relationship between its actions and the principles upon 
which it ± in theory ± bases its action.  From this perspective, even though EU practices of 
international recognition have been politically influential, these practices have implications 
for, and potentially problematize, its normative µpower¶. 
 
Shaping the EU¶s practices of international recognition 
 
Conceptualising the EU¶s role in state recognition requires integrating legal, normative and 
political perspectives, as well as an exploration of the internal and external considerations 
shaping recognition practices (see Figure 1 below). To explore the EU¶s state recognition 
responses it is necessary to provide a framework which accounts for normative divergence 
and convergence. Normative divergence refers to differences amongst the members of an 
organisation on various norms, policies, and responses towards specific challenges. In 
general, it is considered that normative divergence slows dowQRUHYHQSUHYHQWV³HIIHFWLYH
policy co-RUGLQDWLRQLQUHVSRQVHWRVLWXDWLRQVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFULVHV´31. Normative divergence 
within the EU is driven primarily by different national interests among the member states, 
demonstrating that coordination and consensus has been uneven and prone to contingent and 
case-specific circumstances. Therefore, it can be expected that the normative structure of the 
EU¶s state recognition practices would be flexible and more pragmatic than principled. In 
other words, despite a basic predisposition in favour of liberal norms, the EU¶s response to 
secessionist cases is driven by multiple and diverse pressures; in some cases there can be 
policy solidarity while in other cases policy fragmentation.32 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon envisioned an active international role for the EU, led by the High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy.33 The strengthening of the legal basis for the 
EU¶s common foreign and security policy has provided more scope to put forward common 
positions and guidelines on foreign policy, which provide a basis to assume that the EU as a 
whole can shape a state recognition policy. Although the EU has made progress in 
consolidating common foreign, security and defence policies, the organisation does not have 
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legal competency to recognise states as this remains a prerogative right of its members.34 
Therefore, the EU¶s ability to form a collective stance on state recognition rests upon the 
extent to which its institutions and member states have managed to generate consensus on 
when to grant or withhold collective recognition of states, a process which is conditioned by 
national self-interests and trade-offs. In addition, policy-making in the EU is also shaped by 
strong member states which utilize the EU and the principle of solidarity to advance issues of 
national importance.35 The EU¶s recognition practices can therefore be shaped by individual 
members or clusters of states who galvanize support for specific regions and third countries. 
 
The EU¶s practice of state recognition is also shaped by external considerations.  Whether a 
new state comes into existence through the consent of the µparent¶ state and a legitimate 
referendum or through unilateral action, contrary to international law, plays an important role 
in the EU¶s collective stance on state recognition. The EU¶s decision to coordinate the 
recognition of new states thus depends on how much the pathway to independence enjoys 
international legitimacy and legality. The satisfaction of practical and normative criteria of 
statehood on the part of aspiring new states is also important, including a permanent 
population, territory, effective government and the ability to enter in international relations. 
In addition to these traditional standards of statehood, respect for international law, non-
interference in other states¶ internal affairs, and a commitment to democracy, human rights 
and the protection of minorities have also become increasingly but unevenly relevant.36 Of 
course, the EU and its members also have geopolitical interests which play an important role 
in the conduct of foreign policy, which often weigh against and sometimes side-line 
normative considerations ± a tendency which is amply demonstrated in the analysis below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Analytical Framework for Tracing the EU¶s Practice of State Recognition 
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36
 Antoine Buyse and Rick Lawson, µState Recognition: Admission (Im)possible¶, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 20:4 (2007), p. 786. 
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The practices of EU state recognition 
 
In tracing the EU¶s practices of state recognition, we look at all the cases since the early 
1990s where the EU played a role in establishing collective recognition or non-recognition to 
newly (re)established and contested states, and when it has left its members to undertake 
individual decisions. In exploring collective recognition we focus on the former Yugoslav 
and Soviet republics, Eritrea, East Timor and South Sudan. In exploring the EU¶s collective 
non-recognition policy, we focus on cases such as Taiwan, the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC), Somaliland, Western Sahara, Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, and Crimea and Sevastopol. Finally, in examining the EU¶s individual 
recognition and non-recognition policy, we explore the cases of Kosovo and Palestine. By 
looking at this broad range of cases, we disentangle the various rationales invoked to justify 
the EU¶s position on state recognition in order to demonstrate continuity and change in the 
norms and practices governing its role in state recognition. 
 
The methodology used involves looking closely at the empirical detail of the EU¶s political 
dynamics and behaviour in relation to this topic. In IR scholarship there is a growing interest 
in exploring international practices which not only helps to explain diplomatic dynamics and 
performances, but also helps trace and disentangle the emergence of discourses, policies and 
norms in practice.37 Exploring the EU¶s approach to state recognition from the perspective of 
practice helps to make sense of the unevenness, gaps, and inconsistencies in the EU¶s 
practice of state recognition. It helps to account for the role of embedded institutional 
routines, vested interests, and the tactics by various stakeholders which have an interest in 
recognition debates. Focusing on the EU¶s practice of recognition also helps to account for 
structural constraints, the role of agency and practicality, and the impact of situational 
circumstances and external factors which contribute towards state recognition or non-
                                                 
37
 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, µInternational Practices: Introduction and 
Framework¶, in Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (eds) International Practices 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 6. See also: Rebecca Adler-Nissen, 
µTowards a Practice Turn in EU Studies: The Everyday of European Integration¶, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 54:1 (2016), pp. 87-103. 
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recognition. The following sections explore three principal patterns of behaviour in the EU¶s 
practice of international recognition: collective recognition, collective non-recognition, and a 
position of delegating decisions on recognition to EU members.   
 
The EU¶s Practice of Collective Recognition  
 
Since the end of the Cold War the EU has been faced with the challenge of responding to two 
distinct secession scenarios. First, in the context of the emergence of new states following the 
peaceful or violent dissolution of federations. Second, in cases of consensual self-
determination and proclamations of statehood through democratic referenda and under UN 
mediation. One of the early major tests of European unity was the question of the recognition 
of new states emerging from the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and the formation of new 
independent states in the former Soviet space in the early 1990s.38 As Caplan suggests, the 
consequences of this represented a shift away from recent state practice, where recognition 
had generally been in line with non-political criteria.39 The European Community¶s (EC) 
guidelines on the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union 
therefore required not only the fulfilment of objective criteria of statehood, but also a 
commitment to international law, respect for sovereignty, and protection of minorities. 
 
The EC¶s collective recognition policy in the 1990s was driven by a mixture of internal and 
external factors, as well as legal and political considerations. Internally, the EC¶s decision in 
favour of collective recognition of former Yugoslav and Soviet republics aimed at limiting 
unilateralism within the EC¶s member states and demonstrating unity as an aspirational 
global power.40 In the recognition of former Soviet republics, there was full consensus among 
member states to grant recognition to the entities which were republics within the USSR, 
since these were more likely to fulfil the functional criteria of statehood.41 There was an 
overriding concern, reflected in the guidelines for recognition, that the former Soviet 
republics must respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states and resolve their 
disputes peacefully. In the case of the former Yugoslav republics, the inter-governmental 
consensus was a response to Germany¶s intention to recognise Slovenia and Croatia, and 
Greece¶s decision not to recognise Macedonia. At that time, the EC¶s supranational powers in 
the area of foreign and security policy were limited. Therefore, it seems that the presence of a 
strong advocate country, namely Germany, played a significant role in generating internal 
consensus within the EC to create a common position on state recognition. This demonstrates 
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 µDeclarDWLRQRQWKH³*XLGHOLQHVRQWKH5HFRJQLWLRQRI1HZ6WDWHVLQ(DVWHUQ(XURSHDQGLQ
WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ´¶ and µDeclaration on Yugoslavia¶, Extraordinary European Political 
Committee Ministerial meeting, Press Release No. 128/91 and 129/91, Brussels, 16 
December 1991. 
39
 Caplan (2005), p. 2. 
40
 Thomas D. Grant, The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), p. 171. 
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that collective recognition is not always truly consensual, as some states camouflage their 
own national interests within collective efforts and others merely follow the dominant states. 
By threatening to unilaterally recognize Croatia and Slovenia, Germany therefore forged a 
necessity among other European states to take a collective stance in order to avoid harming 
broader regional cooperation. 
 
However, external considerations also played a role in how collective recognition was 
formulated and implemented, in particular in terms of the pathway to independence. 
Recognition was granted to the federal units which had republic status, thus excluding 
autonomous provinces. In the absence of international legal rules and written norms on state 
recognition, the EU¶s case-by-case decisions on recognition, expressed in the form of 
guidelines, legal opinions, and joint communications, have gradually constituted a norm-
making process.42 This assumes that the EU is not addressing cases as entirely discrete, 
isolated decisions, but rather a cumulative process through which normative µbaggage¶ 
evolves and conditions decisions. Externally, the implications of this are that EU decisions 
and EU practice in international recognition has a conditioning effect on the behavior of other 
international actors. 
 
This process emerged with the EC¶s response to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. The 
EC¶s $UELWUDWLRQ &RPPLVVLRQ IRU <XJRVODYLD ³WKH %DGLQWHU &RPPLVVLRQ LVVXHG
consultative and non-binding opinions which clarified matters concerning statehood and 
succession in the context of eventual dissolution of Yugoslavia, but also had wider 
application. The Badinter Commission confirmed that Yugoslavia was in the process of 
dissolution; that republic entities had the right to self-determination; and the existing 
administrative borders of the former Yugoslavia would serve as the new borders of the 
succeeding states. It also established that international recognition should be granted only 
after tangible guarantees were in place for minority protection, and international peace and 
security.43 These legal opinions allowed the imposition of normative and legal considerations 
when granting collective recognition to former Yugoslav republics; Caplan suggests that 
³QRUPVZHUHWKHYHU\EDVLVRIWKH&RPPXQLW\¶VFULWHULDIRUWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIQHZVWDWHV´44 
The new states in the former Yugoslav space were expected to demonstrate respect for 
human rights, especially the rights of national and ethnic groups; support for the UN in 
resolving outstanding issues in the region; and implement constitutional guarantees to ensure 
that new states have no territorial claims towards neighbours. What followed was the EU¶s 
conditional normalisation of diplomatic relations with newly independent republics in 
                                                 
42
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43
 See: Alain Pellet, µThe Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee A Second Breath 
for the Self-Determination of Peoples¶, European Journal of International Law, 3:1 (1992), 
pp. 178±185; Danilo Türk, µRecognition of States: A Comment¶, European Journal of 
International Law, 4:1 (1993), pp. 66-71. 
44
 Caplan (2005), p. 7. 
 13 
exchange for their mutual recognition and full normalisation of relations among the states of 
the former Yugoslavia. 
 
In terms of the recognition of the former Yugoslav republics, the EU has followed the 
international doctrine that borders should not be unilaterally changed, and this was in line 
with the Yugoslav constitution stipulation WKDW³WKH UHSXEOLFV¶ boundaries cannot be altered 
ZLWKRXW WKHLU FRQVHQW´ thus supporting the uti possidentis juris principle.45 This legal and 
constitutional threshold had serious ramification for Kosovo as an autonomous province 
within the former Yugoslavia, but also far-reaching consequences for entities in the former 
Soviet Union, namely Chechnya, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Nevertheless, the practice of 
collective recognition also served as a useful method for disciplining fledgling states through 
the imposition of normative and political conditions, tied to their recognition. The process 
through which the EC collectively recognised the new states of the disintegrating Yugoslavia 
was also driven by security and geopolitical interests. The policy aimed to de-escalate 
conflict and put pressure on the parties to accept a general settlement and ease their re-
integration into international society following a post-war transition. With regard to former 
Soviet republics, the EU considered recognition as an important move for enlarging the EU 
and possibly NATO in eastern Europe, and the expansion of the region¶s market economies.46 
However, the EU¶s collective decision to recognise former Yugoslav republics had an 
unintended effect; rather than serving as an instrument of conflict management it arguably 
intensified violent conflicts in the region. 
 
The former Yugoslavia cases illustrate an evolution and process of learning through 
European practices of state recognition. Initially, these practices were intended to de-escalate 
conflict and shape the domestic and regional circumstances for resolving emerging conflicts 
through imposing conditional terms for recognition. At the time this was controversial since 
it was widely seen to have contributed to the escalation of armed conflict across the region, as 
it reinforced the anxieties of minorities within Croatia and Bosnia and intensified inter-
communal instability. At a later point, the collective recognition policy turned into an 
instrument for shaping the constitutional arrangements of the new independent states in 
relation to the protection of minorities, the peaceful resolution of outstanding disputes, and 
for establishing political guarantees against territorial claims towards neighbouring states. 
However, norm-making on state recognition through the issuance of policy guidelines and 
non-binding legal opinions ± as seen in the Yugoslav case ± has evolved into a broader range 
of less explicit practices. In other cases of collective recognition and non-recognition, joint 
policy positions of member states has formed the basis of implicit norm-making and norm-
implementation. The EU has not been as clear and committed to developing explicit policies 
on state recognition, and in some ways the response to the Yugoslav and former USSR cases 
are exceptional. 
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Beyond the Yugoslav and USSR cases, the EU was able to develop an implicit and derivative 
common recognition policy, mainly in relation to those countries which obtained 
independence via a UN-mediated or consensual process, which thus demonstrated an 
acceptable and uncontested pathway to independence. This is particularly evident with the 
cases of Eritrea, East Timor, Montenegro and South Sudan. In these uncontroversial cases, 
the EU issued joint statements on behalf of all member states, which opened the path for 
individual recognition by its members. The EU has followed globally-accepted practices of 
state recognition where the consent of the host state and self-determination through 
international-supervised referenda have been at the heart of the claim for statehood. In the 
case of East Timor, during the 1990s, despite Portugal¶s and Ireland¶s strong lobbying efforts 
within the EU, a common affirmative position on independence was impossible largely due 
to the UK¶s and Germany¶s relations with Indonesia.47 In the absence of internal consensus 
the EU followed the UN¶s policy on East Timor which supported the transition to 
independence via a popular consultation in 1999. In 2001, following independence, the EU 
issued a statement expressing the EU¶V FRPPLWPHQW ³to the success of the East Timorese 
WUDQVLWLRQ WR LQGHSHQGHQFH´48 Soon after, East Timor was admitted to the UN and did not 
require further bilateral recognitions.  
 
In the case of Montenegro, the EU played a crucial role in mediating the path to 
independence and facilitating a referendum for dismemberment from the union with Serbia in 
2006. The initial test of the EU¶s foreign policy was its role in mediating the formation of the 
union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2002, which set the stage for eventual independence. The 
European Council pronounced that the pathway to independence was compatible with 
national and international law and ³WKDW LW ZLOO IXOO\ UHVSHFW WKH GHFLVLRQ RI WKH SHRSOH RI
0RQWHQHJUR´49 The EU¶s direct involvement in mediating independence was driven by its 
strategic interest of stabilising the Western Balkans and for advancing the enlargement 
process in the region, as exemplified by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with 
Montenegro in 2007.50 The EU¶s hands-on approach in facilitating Montenegro¶s 
independence referendum was normatively based on the findings of the Badinter Commission 
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where Montenegro had the same statehood entitlements as the other Yugoslav republics 
which became independent in the early 1990s.51  
 
Similarly, the EU granted collective recognition to South Sudan following the internationally 
mediated referendum for independence. A declaration issued on 9 July 2011 stated WKDW³>R@Q
this historic day, the EU and its Member States welcome the Republic of South Sudan as a 
QHZLQGHSHQGHQWVWDWH´52 Although there were no normative conditions attached to collective 
recognition, the EU¶V +LJK 5HSUHVHQWDWLYH HQFRXUDJHG WKH QHZ JRYHUQPHQW LQ -XED ³WR
demonstrate its commitment to national reconciliation, democratic and transparent 
JRYHUQDQFHDQGUHVSHFWIRUKXPDQULJKWVDVWKHFRUHRILWVYLVLRQIRUWKHIXWXUH´53 Following 
the EU¶s statement, individual EU members of the EU granted recognition to South Sudan in 
accordance with their own domestic procedures.54 The EU¶s collective recognition of South 
Sudan was driven by the desire for regional stability and represented a natural extension of 
the EU¶s role as one of the witness signatories of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
which ended the civil war and set the path for eventual independence. It is notable that the 
decision of other countries ± such as Turkey and Indonesia ± to recognise South Sudan 
followed from, and made reference to, the EU¶s decision to do so, and also followed some of 
the normative language used by EU.55 The AU also used similar normative language when 
admitting South Sudan as a new member state.56 
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Across a range of cases the EU¶s guidelines for state recognition have performed the function 
of conditioning and coordinating the foreign policy of its members as well as influencing the 
response of the wider international community. While the EU does not recognise states in a 
traditional sense, its collective statements serve as policy guidance and path-openers for 
bilateral recognition, given the EU¶s global stature. The collective position of the EU as a 
significant group of states has also influenced the recognition decisions of other states, which 
position the EU as norm-builder in the broader context. For example, the EU¶s practice of 
collective recognition shaped the response of the wider international community towards the 
former Yugoslav republics, thereby facilitating their passage to universal recognition evident 
in their admission to the UN and the establishment of bilateral relations broadly. While in the 
case of the former Yugoslavia the practice of collective recognition was driven by 
geopolitical interests, the uncontroversial cases ± such as Eritrea, East Timor, Montenegro 
and South Sudan ± helped attune the EU¶s practice of state recognition to wider UN 
practices. Yet across all the cases of collective recognition, it seems that satisfaction of core 
statehood criteria has not played a decisive role in shaping the EU¶s policy of state 
recognition, which underscores the political nature of this process. Indeed, state fragility 
among the newly independent states provided space for the EU to intervene and assist in 
statebuilding and political reform.57As the Yugoslav and former Soviet cases suggest, the EU 
has tried to make recognition of states conditional upon their adherence to principles of 
international law, including protection for minorities and peaceful resolution of disputes 
between the seceding and former host states. However, while this adherence to the existing 
international order established the path for the EU¶s response to other secessionist entities 
and contested states, the EU¶s practice of state recognition is not pre-determined by 
principles and norms, but shaped by situational circumstances and geopolitical dynamics.   
 
The EU¶s Practice of Collective Non-recognition  
 
The practice of collective non-recognition invokes an obligation among states within a 
specific community not to recognise the sovereignty of entities which claim statehood for a 
variety of possible reasons, but principally when their creation is in breach of fundamental 
norms of international law.58 Over the years this doctrine has played a key role in maintaining 
a conservative expansion of international society. The EU¶s practice of collective non-
recognition has been pursued in three distinct situations, driven by external considerations 
which are generally faithful to legal doctrine but which also reflect political imperatives. 
Collective non-recognition has been observed when the entity concerned has proclaimed 
independence without the consent of the host state, when the secession and independence 
have taken place through aggressive and coercive methods, and when the EU¶s and its 
                                                                                                                                                       
Recognizes-the-Independence-of-South-Sudan.aspx. The EU¶s statement of collective 
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members¶ geopolitical interests would be threatened by the recognition of a new state. 
However, controversies have sometimes arisen as the EU has sought to balance its normative 
commitments with its geopolitical interests, particularly when the pursuit of a collective 
policy has put it at odds with powerful international partners. 
 
One of the earliest examples where the EU took a collective non-recognition stance is 
Taiwan, a typical case where the EU has followed the geopolitical interests of its members 
and the UN¶s position. The EU¶s official positiRQ WRZDUGV7DLZDQ LV LQ OLQHZLWK WKH³2QH
&KLQD´ SROLF\: the EU recognises only the People¶s Republic of China, and therefore it 
has no diplomatic or formal political relations with Taiwan. In all policy documents it is 
H[SOLFLWO\ VWDWHG WKDW ³the EU does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state and has no 
GLSORPDWLFRUIRUPDOUHODWLRQVZLWK7DLZDQ´59 The EU¶s common position on Taiwan is that 
it should resolve its differences with China through peaceful dialogue, avoiding any use or 
threat of force. Yet, the presence of advocate member states within the EU has played a role 
in the establishment of economic relations with Taiwan without diplomatic recognition. 
Some European states are closer to Taiwan due to its commitment to democracy and human 
rights, and others ± because of their extensive trade and investment exchanges with China ± 
are more solidly opposed to any relationship with the Taiwanese authorities.60 Nevertheless, 
most EU members have economic and trade offices in Taiwan, and EU members are major 
investors there. The European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan is the EU¶s 
representative office in Taipei, which focuses on non-controversial areas such as education, 
research, and technical programmes. This technical approach ensures functional cooperation 
with Taiwan without formal recognition, as well as demonstrating the possibility for political 
and economic interaction without antagonising the geopolitical interests of EU members. 
This modus vivendi is likely to continue as the practice has provided stability and 
predictability for both sides.61 Nevertheless, the denial of Taiwan¶s statehood ± 
understandable and sensible from a geopolitical perspective ± does expose a tension between 
the EU¶s liberal normative identity and some of its recognition practices. 
 
The EU has also adopted a policy of collective non-recognition of the µTurkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus¶ (TRNC), since the entity declared independence in 1983. Turkey is 
currently the only state which recognises the TRNC, in defiance of claims of sovereignty 
over the territory by the Republic of Cyprus. UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) 
considered the creation of TRNC to be ³OHJDOO\ LQYDOLG´7KH(8¶s position on the Cyprus 
problem is that a comprehensive settlement for a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation should be 
resolved through peaceful dialogue and in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. 
The EU¶s collective non-recognition policy of TRNC was primarily influenced by internal 
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considerations, especially the vested interests of Greece and the UK. When Cyprus joined the 
EU in 2004 EU members recognised the Republic of Cyprus as the only subject of 
international law on the island. However, Protocol 10 of Cyprus¶s Accession Treaty 
suspended EU legislation (acquis) in the areas where the Government of Cyprus does not 
exercise effective control, namely the TRNC controlled areas. In 2007, the EU reiterated the 
collective non-UHFRJQLWLRQ SROLF\ ZKHQ LW VWDWHG WKDW ³>W@KH VR-called µTurkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus¶ is recognised neither by the European Union nor by any of its Member 
6WDWHV´62 This non-recognition policy is also supported by external considerations, including 
the circumstances which led to proclaimed independence through Turkish intervention, the 
lack of support from the UN, and the threats to regional stability. However, despite not 
recognising the TRNC, the EU continues to provide aid to the Turkish Cypriot community to 
foster inter-communal reconciliation, help prepare for reunification, and bring the region 
closer to the EU. This balancing approach between internal and external considerations 
involves avoiding any recognition of TRNC, maintaining good relations with Turkey (at least 
until 2016), and satisfying EU members, especially Cyprus and Greece. 
 
The EU has also adopted a policy of collective non-recognition of Nagorno Karabakh and 
Transnistria, two breakaway regions and µfrozen conflicts¶ in the Caucasus region. The EU¶s 
position is that these breakaway territories belong to their Soviet-era states whose territorial 
integrity must be respected, thus independence contra international law must be prohibited. 
The EU openly reiterates ³LWV VXSSRUW IRU WKH WHUULWRULDO LQWHJULW\ RI$]HUEDLMDQ DQG UHFDOOV
WKDW LWGRHVQRW UHFRJQLVH WKH LQGHSHQGHQFHRI1DJRUQR.DUDEDNK´63 It further emphasised 
³WKH QHHG WR HVWDEOLVK D VWDEOH SROLWLFDO DJUHHPHQW FRQFHUQLQJ 1DJRUQR .DUDEDNK ZKLFK
should be DFFHSWDEOH WR ERWK $UPHQLD DQG $]HUEDLMDQ´ Similarly, driven by internal 
considerations and the pressure from east European member states such as Romania, the EU 
IDYRXUV ³D FRPSUHKHQVLYH SHDFHIXO VHWWOHPHQW RI WKH 7UDQVQLVWULDQ FRQIOLFW EDVHG RQ WKH
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for 
7UDQVQLVWULD´.64 As these conflicts do not pose immediate security threats, there is no apparent 
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urgency for the EU to find a sustainable solution, while the policy of engagement without 
recognition fulfils EU¶s basic political and security interests.65   
 
Somaliland is another self-proclaimed state which has not been recognised by the EU. 
Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 and since then it has managed to 
exist and develop resiliently without international recognition. In 2012, the EU High 
5HSUHVHQWDWLYHGHFODUHGWKDW³>W@KH(8OLNHWKH81FRQVLGHUV6RPDOLODQGSDUWRI6RPDOLDLQ
respect of the country¶s territorial integrity´66 While in principle the EU does not recognise 
Somaliland because of its non-consensual secession, the policy of collective non-recognition 
is also motivated by geopolitical considerations, fearing that the alteration of borders could 
destabilise the entire Horn of Africa, a strategic route for European trade. However, while 
withholding diplomatic recognition, the EU and its member states have gradually recognised 
Somaliland¶s trajectory towards democratic consolidation, domestic reconciliation and 
stability. The EU¶s policy towards Somaliland therefore amounts to engagement without 
recognition, which consists of providing aid and technical assistance to ensure that the 
territory does not become an exporter of insecurity.67 The EU¶s assistance focuses on 
improving economic development, agriculture, infrastructure and governance. This 
notwithstanding, the EU considers that D ³permanent solution to the status of Somaliland 
should be reached through negotiations between the authorities of Somaliland and the Federal 
*RYHUQPHQW RI 6RPDOLD´68 Somaliland is another example of the EU¶s practice of 
recognition which exposes a tension between its normative commitments ± to democracy and 
self-determination ± and its commitment to Westphalian principle of state sovereignty. The 
tension is all the more acute since Somaliland, for some years, achieved a greater degree of 
state consolidation and democracy than other states in the region. 
 
The EU is also engaged in the case of Western Sahara, which has been occupied by the 
Kingdom of Morocco since 1975. Following decolonisation the UN Security Council called 
for a referendum on self-determination for the region, which would open the path to 
independent statehood. However, Morocco and Mauritania occupied parts of Western Sahara 
which were later declared by the International Court of Justice to be an illegal occupation. To 
date, Western Sahara remains under Moroccan occupation. EU member states are divided on 
the recognition of Western Sahara, highlighting once again the salience of strong advocate 
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states in shaping the recognition policy.69 While Spain, a former colonial power over Western 
Sahara, appears to support the right of the Sahrawi people for self-determination, France 
tends to side more with Morocco for geopolitical and cultural reasons. Unable to generate a 
common affirmative position, the EU¶s position so far has been that it ³VXSSRUWV WKH 81
Secretary-General¶s efforts to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political 
solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the 
context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the 
81´70 Yet, as part of its efforts to secure its southern borders and deepen political influence 
in North Africa, the EU has signed an association agreement with Morocco, which entails 
enhanced political and economic relations.71 This implies, because of its geopolitical needs, 
that the EU has come to gradually accept Morocco¶s de facto control of Western Sahara, 
despite being in violation of UN resolutions, international law, and a ruling by the European 
Court of Justice. Again, this is a demonstration of the tension between the EU¶s normative 
self-image and its material interests, exposed as a consequence of a more active external 
engagement. 
 
While in the previous cases the EU¶s recognition policy was implicit in its own practices, the 
first time the EU pursued an explicit position of collective non-recognition was in the cases 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two breakaway regions of Georgia. This policy was a three-
fold position, involving: explicitly and unanimously stating that no EU members would 
recognise the break-away territories; calling on other states not to recognise the independence 
SURFODPDWLRQVDQGFRQGHPQLQJ³5XVVLD¶s unilateral decision to recognise the independence 
RI $ENKD]LD DQG 6RXWK 2VVHWLD´72 The extraordinary European Council meeting of 1 
September 2008 outlined EU¶s common position: 
 
³7KH(XURSHDQ&RXQFLO VWURQJO\FRQGHPQV5XVVLD¶s unilateral decision to recognise 
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That decision is unacceptable and 
the European Council calls on other States not to recognise this proclaimed 
independence and asks the Commission to examine the practical consequences to be 
drawn..´73 
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In the case of Georgia ± embroiled in disputes with separatist movements and with Russia ±  
the EU claims to be committed to ³WKH SULQFLSOHV RI independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and the inviolability of the internationally recognised borders´ of the country, and it 
has been active in pursuit of this stance.74 In implementing a collective policy of non-
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU issued instructions in June 2011 to the 
EU¶s delegations and the diplomatic networks of members to send a demarche to countries 
across WKHZRUOG7KHSXUSRVHRIWKLVGHPDUFKHZDV³to remind relevant EU partners about 
the importance that tKH(8DWWDFKHVWRWKHVRYHUHLJQW\DQGWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\RI*HRUJLD´75 
The demarche encouraged partner countries to maintain their policy of non-recognition, 
highlighting WKHGHWULPHQWDOHIIHFWRIVHFHVVLRQ³WRWKHVWDELOLW\DQGVHFXULW\RIWKHUHJLRQ´
LQFOXGLQJ³WKHRQJRLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOHIIRUWVWRILQGDVROXWLRQWRWKHFRQIOLFWV´76 Finally, the 
GHPDUFKHWKUHDWHQHGWKDW³DQ\UHFRJQLWLRQZRXOGKXUWWKHFRUHLQWHUHVWVRIthe EU and would 
QRWEHZLWKRXWFRQVHTXHQFHVWRWKHTXDOLW\DQGGHSWKRI\RXUUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH(8´77 This 
goes far beyond passive non-recognition. Simultaneously, however, the EU has promoted a 
policy of engagement with Abkhazia and other Eurasian unrecognized breakaway regions, 
because of the risks of disengagement. The essence of this policy is to engage with the 
breakaway regions on political, economic and cultural matters, while side-lining the question 
of international legal sovereignty and diplomatic recognition.78 Although the EU has not 
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it has therefore provided financial support for 
economic development and civil society. The aim of this policy is primarily geo-strategic: to 
reduce Russia¶s strategic leverage over these regions and have a stake in the de-escalation of 
tensions springing from international isolation.79 However, any engagement by the EU, even 
when approached in a manner which is sensitive to local conflicts, has an impact upon 
regional politics and contributes to tensions between the EU and Russia. 
 
The most recent example of the EU¶s explicit and robust collective position of non-
recognition is Crimea, formulated by the Council of the EU together with the Commission 
and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, and again driven by internal 
and external pressures. Following Russia¶s intervention into Crimea and Sevastopol the 
President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission issued a 
joint statement on 18 March 2014, VWDWLQJ WKDW ³[t]he sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of Ukraine must be respected. The European Union does neither recognise the 
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LOOHJDO DQG LOOHJLWLPDWH UHIHUHQGXP LQ &ULPHD QRU LWV RXWFRPH´ 7KH (8¶s strong response 
came after Russia¶s incursion into Crimea, which occurred after Ukraine expressed its 
intention to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. This made the EU directly 
implicated in the crisis, for which it needed to take strong political measures. The aggression 
against Ukraine represented a serious threat to the Euro-Atlantic community, and particularly 
alarmed the EU¶s Nordic and Eastern members, who felt an acute threat to their security and 
territorial integrity. For this reason, these countries have been at the forefront of the EU¶s 
policy of non-recognition of Crimea and Sevastopol. For example, in a joint statement, the 
Foreign Ministers of Sweden, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, and Denmark claimed that 
³WKH (8¶s non-recognition policy of the annexation is the clearest and most effective 
PDQLIHVWDWLRQRIRXUVXSSRUW´DQGWKDWWKLVSROLF\³ZLOOUHPDLQLQSODFHDVORQJDV5XVVLD¶s 
illegal annexation continues´.80  
 
In parallel to internal considerations ± including the physical threat to some EU countries ± 
the formulation of the collective non-recognition policy was driven by the contested path to 
independence, the absence of state-like attributes, and the destabilising effects of the Crimean 
conflict. The EU¶s stance was supported by UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 (2014) 
which called XSRQ ³all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to 
recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of 
Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and to refrain from any action or 
GHDOLQJ WKDWPLJKWEH LQWHUSUHWHGDV UHFRJQL]LQJDQ\VXFKDOWHUHGVWDWXV´81 The goal of the 
EU¶s common position on non-UHFRJQLWLRQZDV³WRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKH(8GRHVQRWDFFHSW
the illegal annexation, using tangible measures in addition to regular political and diplomatic 
DFWLRQ´.82 However, the policy went a step further by introducing sanctions against Russia 
and the Crimea region, including freezing assets and imposing visa bans, and condemning 
human rights abuses against ethnic Tatars in Crimea.83 Interestingly, the EU¶s policy of non-
recognition of Crimea and Sevastopol not only obliges its members to adhere to the policy, 
but also requires compliance from candidate countries, including Albania, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Turkey, the potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the members 
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of the European Economic Area (EEA) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
such as Liechtenstein and Norway, as well as Ukraine and Georgia.  
 
At an unprecedented scale, the Crimea case illustrates that the EU has taken a strong 
collective stance against the recognition of those states that tend to be pawns of a major 
adversary power, such as Russia. However, the EU has locked itself into a non-recognition 
policy which will shape EU-Russia relations for the foreseeable future, something that will 
become increasingly contentious as Russia gains stronger regional support and influence. 
Within the EU itself, the EU¶s sanctions on Russia ± as a part of this collective non-
recognition policy ± have harmed the economies of some member states and have increased 
energy insecurity, which in turn questions the viability of such a forthright stance against 
Russia.84 Moreover, Russia¶s response to sanctions ± its campaign to propagate 
disinformation to weaken the EU¶s institutional unity and encourage populist, fragmentary 
tendencies ± has raised a serious challenge to the integrity of the EU.85 
 
Tracing the EU¶s practice of collective non-recognition demonstrates that the EU has 
followed global orthodoxies for preserving the existing state-centric order, although this does 
not always correspond to the EU¶s progressive agenda in other foreign policy areas, such as 
the promotion of gender equality, democracy, human security and human rights. Yet the 
EU¶s practice of state recognition is determined on a case-by-case basis, which gives some 
scope for pragmatism. On the one hand, when the EU and its member states do not have 
compelling vested interests in specific cases ± such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, 
Somaliland and Western Sahara ± they tend to align their position with that of the UN, in the 
interests of international order and regional stability. On the other hand, when the EU¶s 
geopolitical interests are affected, it has tended to develop a policy of engagement without 
recognition, and ensured that unrecognised states do not become pariah entities endangering 
regional stability. Political and diplomatic non-recognition are therefore combined with 
socio-economic and technical cooperation. However, while the policy of non-recognition 
might be a viable solution ± to balance the EU¶s political interests and legal obligations ± in 
the long run the persistence of contested territories can become a source of insecurity, 
injustice, and inequality, which run against the EU¶s fundamental normative commitments. 
Collective non-recognition might be in the interests of regional organisations and wider 
stability; however, for unrecognised states this may also represent a hegemonic impasse 
which prevents their opportunity to gradually obtain recognition. Engagement without 
recognition is therefore rarely free from controversy. 
 
The EU¶s Practice of Bilateral Recognition 
 
As the EU¶s policy of state recognition is determined on a case-by-case basis and depends 
upon the extent of internal consensus, in two significant cases ± Kosovo and Palestine ± EU 
members have pursued individual decisions and policies on recognition. Following Kosovo¶s 
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independence the EU Council conclusions on Kosovo (issued in February 2008) set out the 
EU¶s collective stance on the question of independence and recognition.86 In the absence of 
internal consensus, the European Council noted that ³0HPEHU 6WDWHV ZLOO GHFLGH LQ
DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK QDWLRQDO SUDFWLFH DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ RQ WKHLU UHODWLRQV ZLWK .RVRYR´87 
This was the cornerstone statement of the EU¶s policy of bilateral recognition of Kosovo¶s 
independence. The European Council clearly did not contest the declaration of independence, 
nor consider it in breach of international law. While the EU reaffirmed its adherence to the 
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, it stated the circumstances that make 
.RVRYR³DVXLJHQHULVcase which does not call into question these principles,´88 highlighting 
two important factors: humanitarian intervention and the UN interim administration of 
Kosovo. So far, 23 out of 28 EU members have recognised the independence of Kosovo and 
have established full diplomatic relations.  
 
Although the most influential EU member states ± Germany, France and the UK ± seem to 
have pushed for a common position on Kosovo¶s future status, the EU ultimately failed to 
offer Kosovo collective recognition due to internal resistance from five members, who for 
different domestic reasons were not ready to accept Kosovo¶s independence. Spain is 
sensitive about the establishment of any precedent which may exacerbate separatist pressures 
in Catalonia, and Cyprus and Greece were directly preoccupied with the status of TRNC. 
Slovakia and Romania similarly feared encouragement to potential claims for expanding 
autonomy among their national minorities. 
 
In addition to internal considerations ± particularly the lack of consensus among its members 
± the EU¶s pragmatic approach to Kosovo was also driven by external considerations. 
Kosovo¶s remedial path to independence after the failure of UN-mediated talks, its 
satisfaction of core statehood criteria, and the need for regional peace and stability in the 
Western Balkans, were key to the broad support that it had for statehood.89 Most importantly, 
the EU promised Kosovo, alongside the rest of the region, the prospect of eventual 
membership in the EU upon satisfaction of various political and economic criteria.90 Even in 
the absence of collective recognition of Kosovo the EU therefore sent signals that imply 
recognition of Kosovo¶s independence.91 Acts of implied recognition can represent a broad 
range of acts, including exchanging diplomatic representatives, participation in international 
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conferences, and participation in multilateral treaties.92 Implied collective recognition 
arguably exists in the prospect of membership of the EU, which is not granted to non-state 
entities or any other contested territories. Kosovo signed the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2015, which signifies political, economic, and legal 
engagement between the EU and states that seek membership. In June 2016, High 
5HSUHVHQWDWLYH0RJKHULQLFODULILHGWKDW³>W@KHIDFWWKDWVRPH0HPEHU6WDWHVGRQRWUHFRJQLVH
Kosovo as an independent state does not constitute an obstacle for Kosovo to implement the 
obligations that arise from the SAA, nor for the EU to continue to provide assistance to 
.RVRYRDVLWKDVGRQHXQWLOQRZ´93 Within this framework, the five EU member states which 
continue to withhold recognition of Kosovo¶s independence have adopted a pragmatic policy 
of engagement without recognition, which entails supporting Kosovo¶s European integration 
and permitting the EU¶s support for the country¶s political and economic development.94 
 
More explicitly, the European Parliament, through numerous non-binding resolutions, has 
HQFRXUDJHG ³WKRVH (8 0HPEHU 6WDWHV ZKLFK KDYH QRW DOUHDG\ GRQH VR WR UHFRJQLVH WKH
LQGHSHQGHQFHRI.RVRYR´95 This notwithstanding, the EU continued to insert a disclaimer in 
all official communication with Kosovo DVVHUWLQJWKDWWKHGHVLJQDWLRQRI.RVRYRLV³ZLWKRXW
prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion 
RQ WKH .RVRYR GHFODUDWLRQ RI LQGHSHQGHQFH´96 The lack of a clear position on Kosovo¶s 
independence raises questions about the EU¶s internal unity, complicates the enlargement 
process, and risks undermining EU¶s interests in the Western Balkans.97 Moreover, the lack 
of a common position not only demonstrates the limits of regional organisations in shaping 
regional peace and stability, but also does little to contribute to the resolution of protracted 
disputes in the region. Nonetheless, in 2011 the EU agreed to facilitate a technical and 
political dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, which might 
eventually lead to mutual recognition in the process of joining the EU ± an outcome which 
would make the EU a genuine regional peace-maker.    
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Another significant case of bilateral recognition by EU member states is Palestine, which has 
received different forms and degrees of political contact within the EU. Inside the EU there is 
wide consensus between all member states and the supranational structures on how to resolve 
the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Yet, the EU has reiterated that ³UHFRJQLWLRQ RI D VWDWH LV QRW
within the competences of the European Union. It is a competence, technically and politically 
D UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI PHPEHU VWDWHV´98 In line with this, Sweden was the first country to 
unilaterally extend diplomatic recognition to Palestine in 2014. While the EU does not have a 
common policy regarding the recognition of Palestine¶s statehood, it has a common position 
on the Middle East PeaFH 3URFHVV ZKLFK LV ³D MXVW DQG FRPSUHKHQVLYH UHVROXWLRQ RI WKH
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on the two state solution, with the state of Israel and an 
independent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign, and viable State of Palestine, living side by 
siGHLQSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\DQGPXWXDOUHFRJQLWLRQ´99 
 
While there are several strong advocate states supporting Israeli and Palestinian interests, the 
nature of the path to independence is particularly important in any future recognition of 
Palestine. The EU as a collective entity has withheld collective recognition of Palestine in the 
hope that a mutually acceptable peace settlement would be reached between the Israel 
government and the Palestinian authorities. Initially, the EU member states supported the 
Palestinian right to self-determination, while constantly failing to have a unified position on 
the recognition of statehood.100 ,QWKH(8&RXQFLOH[SUHVVHG³its readiness to recognize 
D3DOHVWLQLDQ6WDWHZKHQDSSURSULDWH´DQG³LWVVXSSRUWDQGZLVKIRU3DOHVWLQHWREHFRPHDIXOO
member of the United Nations as part of a solution to the FRQIOLFW´ZKLFKIRU WKH(8LV³D
two-state solution with the State of Israel and a sovereign, democratic, contiguous and viable 
6WDWH RI 3DOHVWLQH ERWK OLYLQJ LQ DJUHHG ERUGHUV DQG HQMR\LQJ SHDFH DQG VHFXULW\´101 For 
0DUWLQV ³>D@ EURDG (XURSHDQ UHFRJQLWLon of the state of Palestine would have important 
FRQVHTXHQFHV´ VXFK DV ³UHLQIRUFH 3DOHVWLQH¶s international aspirations and boost its 
participation in international instiWXWLRQV´ JDLQ OHJDO SURWHFWLRQ E\ DFFHVVLQJ ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO
MXULVGLFWLRQV´DQG³HQKance the engagement of international institutions and other non-state 
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DFWRUV LQ ILQGLQJ D VROXWLRQ WR WKH FRQIOLFW´102 However, geopolitical interests intermeshed 
with a special relationship between some EU members and Israel seemingly prevent the 
formation of consensus, and again illustrates how the EU¶s approach to recognition is often 
contested both internally and externally. 
 
In both the Kosovo and Palestine cases, there are grounds within international law for 
granting collective recognition and their full acceptance within the society of states. Yet, the 
EU¶s policy on these two cases is a by-product of internal dynamics, and in the case of 
Palestine, an external environment conditioned by transatlantic relations and geopolitical 
calculations. The cases of Kosovo and Palestine, where the EU¶s member states and 
supranational structures were unable to consolidate a common position, show that the EU¶s 
diplomatic agency to shape the foreign policies of its members is limited in the face of acute, 
conflicting interests. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The EU, as a regional organisation, does not recognise states in the traditional sense, but it 
can generate common positions amongst its members which have a significant effect upon 
the foreign policy actions of these states and also steer global opinion ± and sometimes 
practice ± on particular cases. The EU¶s capacity to formulate a position on state recognition 
is a product of agreement among members to decide when to grant the EU permission to 
speak on behalf of all members and when to retain that right individually to themselves. 
Common positions have reduced the diplomatic costs of individual states to deal with 
disputed cases, as well as an opportunity for certain states to promote their national interests 
within a more legitimate common position. Moreover, conditionality clauses have promoted 
the EU¶s normative worldview related to the peaceful resolution of disputes, sovereignty, and 
human rights protection. This has enabled the EU and its members to reproduce the existing 
conservative order concerning state recognition in international politics, while also promoting 
a normative agenda and foreign policy interests related to EU enlargement, peacebuilding, 
security, trade, aid and development. Punitive clauses attached to recognition reveal the EU¶s 
diplomacy of soft coercion and the hybrid approach to the implementation of its foreign 
policy which ranges from diplomatic sanctions to more robust enforcement measures. These 
aspects speak of the emergence of a unique policy of state recognition which is fluid in nature 
and changes its features depending on the EU¶s internal dynamics and the specificities of new 
states seeking diplomatic recognition. The performative function of EU common positions on 
state recognition not only discipline the conduct of its members but also influence the 
position of other states which are indirectly associated with the EU. 
 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the EU¶s practice of state recognition is driven by 
internal and external normative and geopolitical considerations applied inconsistently in light 
of the circumstances of each case. As summarised in Table 1, in relation to the 37 state-like 
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entities seeking recognition since the early 1990s, the EU has been able to formulate and 
grant collective recognition to 26 states, it has withheld collective recognition from nine self-
proclaimed states, and left it to its members to decide on a national policy in two specific 
cases. Cases which have received collective recognition by the EU have satisfied most, if not 
all, of the following conditions: full consensus among EU member states on whether to 
recognize the entity in question; close involvement by the European Commission and the 
High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy; the presence of strong advocate states 
within the EU; a declaration of independence following an internationally-supervised 
referendum; fulfilment of core statehood criteria; and a strong fit with the geopolitical 
interests of the EU and its members. Although the EU¶s supranational powers play a 
significant role in shaping the national and foreign policies of the member states, full 
consensus among members has been pivotal for the EU to formulate a common position on 
state recognition. The role of supranational structures, namely the European Commission and 
the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, was more evident in shaping the 
EU¶s µengagement without recognition¶ policy in the absence of full diplomatic recognition. 
The presence of strong advocate states within the EU played a far more significant role in 
restraining than in enabling a collective recognition policy. When full consensus was 
impossible, the response varied, encouraging either bilateral recognition, engagement without 
recognition, or collective non-recognition. 
 
In terms of different pathways to independence, the EU has encountered state formation 
rooted in aggression, civil war and foreign invasion, as demonstrated in the case of TRNC, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea. Even though state weakness represents one of main 
security threats to the EU, the absence of some of the core statehood criteria ± such as 
effective government ± does not seem to have played a decisive role in shaping the EU¶s state 
recognition policy, especially when independence was endorsed by the UN and the wider 
international community, evident in cases such as Eritrea, South Sudan and East Timor. This 
might be explained by a spatial consideration. Geopolitical and security sensitivities have 
pushed the EU to develop a more assertive stance towards geographically proximate 
contested and unrecognised states, compared to those cases which are considered to be more 
distant. This said, the EU, constrained by the conservative international rules on territorial 
integrity and the sanctity of borders, has not extended diplomatic recognition to disputed 
territories away from its borders, such as in the case of Chechnya, Taiwan, Tibet and several 
secessionist movements in Indonesia.  
 
The EU has predominantly justified state recognition on legal and normative grounds. Yet 
geopolitical interests, especially concerns for regional stability, have been present across all 
cases in favour and against collective recognition. In the cases of Palestine, TRNC and 
Taiwan ± where the EU was not able to play a leading role due to internal and external 
constraints ± it has followed the UN¶s position and respected the hierarchical order of 
international organisations. In other cases, where the EU could not generate full internal 
consensus and its members had vested geopolitical interests, such as Kosovo and Western 
Sahara, the EU has not been entirely guided by norms of international law. While in the case 
of Western Sahara, the International Court of Justice has ruled in favour of an independence 
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referendum and a right to self-determination, and in the case of Kosovo it has ruled that the 
declaration of independence did not breach international law.103 Yet the EU has not formed 
collective recognition positions in either case. 
 
Where the EU has differed from, and perhaps contributed to, doctrinal development has been 
in terms of the normative conditionality attached to the recognition process as well as with 
the ambiguous creativity in engaging with unrecognised states, as it attempts ± with varying 
levels of success ± to balance geopolitical interests and normative commitments. The EU 
therefore demonstrates that regional organisations can play an important role in shaping the 
norms of recognition, especially in defining the character of recognition, in clarifying the 
discretionary and political character of recognition, and in setting conditions on a case-by-
case basis to shape the decisions of its members. The EU is thus a tentative norm-maker in 
the context of state recognition. 
 
As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, the practices of international recognition and 
non-recognition have also played an important role in the evolution of the EU¶s external 
engagement, and in strengthening the organisation¶s credentials as a global actor. At an 
unprecedented scale, the EU, as a regional organisation, has been able to make an impact by 
extending or withholding recognition to new states ± a significant change in the existing 
international order. Therefore, EU practices have made an important contribution to the 
evolving politics of international recognition, especially in demonstrating the existence of 
states in the grey area between recognition and non-recognition, and the challenges of 
engagement without recognition. Mainstream perspectives assume that recognition takes 
place in an anarchic international environment, highlighting the essential support of dominant 
powers in securing universal recognition.104 Yet in the case of the EU, where decisions must 
be taken unanimously, even one small state can block the formation of a common position on 
recognition. In such circumstances, opportunities arise for some states to push forward a 
national agenda and camouflage it as the EU common position. However, the EU¶s responses 
to international recognition challenges have exposed a number of fundamental problems. 
Firstly, while collective responses to the formation of new states can be seen as opportunities 
to deepen the EU¶s political integration and enhance its foreign policy, in practice the 
presence or absence of collective policy for recognition of new states poses challenges for 
EU institutions and its members. The EU¶s differentiated approach to state recognition, 
determined on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, reveals weaknesses and 
inconsistencies, and also exposes internal tensions and limitations as an aspiring global actor. 
 
Secondly, the EU¶s practices of international recognition demonstrate a tension between the 
EU¶s normative commitments and its commitment to an international order based upon 
                                                 
103
 International Court of Justice, µAdvisory Opinion on Western Sahara¶, 16 October 1975, 
available at: { http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/61/6197.pdf} and µAdvisory Opinion 
on Kosovo¶, 22 July 2010, available at { http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-
20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf}, accessed 26 July 2017. 
104
 For example, see Coggins (2014). 
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Westphalian, statist principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU is, in principle, 
committed to self-determination, democracy and human rights. In some cases it has denied 
recognition to viable entities which have a strong remedial case for recognition. It has 
pursued a policy of engagement without recognition and formed humanitarian and technical 
links with separatist regions which it does not recognise, with questionable results. As a first 
line of response, the EU has tried to adjust its policy of state recognition in line with 
international law and global consensus within the UN. However, in cases such as Kosovo 
where normative commitments, geopolitical interests, and the question of legality of 
independence are resolved, the EU was unable to generate an affirmative position on the 
recognition of new states. Thus, a common state recognition policy would strengthen the 
EU¶s credentials as a global actor; yet such a move would come at the cost of deepening 
internal divisions among members. 
 
Thirdly, there is also a conflict between the EU¶s practices of international recognition (and 
non-recognition) and its geopolitical interests. In the cases of frozen conflicts in the EU¶s 
eastern and southern neighbourhood, the geopolitical interests of certain EU member states 
have prevented the EU from following a more consistent, rule-based policy. In other cases, 
the solidification of a common non-recognition policy ± such as in the cases of Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, and Crimea ± has antagonized Russia and unintentionally contributed to the 
hardening of frozen conflicts. Whilst the collective policy on state recognition or non-
recognition has for most members reduced the burden of bilateral diplomacy regarding 
(non)recognition, it has sometimes tied EU members to unwelcome commitments which can 
jeopardize their political and economic interests. 
 
The EU¶s response to state recognition has been profoundly impacted by the recurring 
problem of normative divergence among its member states on foreign policy matters. The 
lack of collective stance on state recognition as a result of normative divergences and 
insufficient policy coordination can potentially weaken the EU¶s international standing and 
credibility and foreign policy actor. This also provides a further challenge to the idea of 
µnormative power Europe¶. The EU¶s practices of recognition are unlikely to reify the 
existing norms, orthodoxies and inconsistencies of state recognition. A more coherent 
recognition policy would provide clarity and credibility to the EU and expand its external 
influence, but it is highly questionable, based upon the experience of the last two decades, 
whether the geopolitical and normative tensions can be adequately reconciled. EU practice is 
therefore likely to continue to represent an imperfect case-by-case approach, guided both by 
principles and interests. 
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Table 1: The EU¶s Internal and External Considerations for State Recognition  
Country 
Internal considerations External considerations 
Outcome Inter-governmental 
consensus 
Role of 
supranatio
nal 
structures 
Presence of 
strong advocate 
Pathway to 
independence 
Fulfilment 
of statehood 
criteria 
Geopolitical 
interests 
Europe 
Former 
Yugoslav 
Republics* 
Partial 
consensus   
Weak role Germany, France, 
UK, and Greece 
(in the case of 
Macedonia)  
Declaration of 
independence after 
violent dissolution of 
a federal state 
(Yugoslavia) 
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
present  
Conflict de-
escalation and 
regional security 
Collective 
recognition  
Former 
Soviet 
Republics ** 
Full consensus  Weak role Broad support 
among the EC 
member states 
Declaration of 
independence after 
peaceful dissolution of 
a federal state (USSR) 
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
present 
Regional 
security, 
democratisation 
and expansion 
of market 
economy 
Collective 
recognition 
Montenegro 
 
 
Full consensus  Strong 
role 
Broad support 
among the EU 
member states 
Restoration of 
Independence after 
EU-supervised 
referendum  
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
present 
Regional 
security and 
member-state 
building 
Collective 
recognition 
Kosovo 
 
 
Partial 
consensus 
(objection by 
five EU 
member 
states)  
Strong 
role 
UK, Germany and 
France 
Coordinated 
declaration of 
independence after 
failed UN-mediated 
talks  
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
present 
Regional 
security and 
member-state 
building 
Bilateral 
recognition  
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Caucasus and Eurasia 
Abkhazia, 
South 
Ossetia, 
Nagorno-
Karabakh, 
Transnistria 
Full consensus  Strong 
role 
East European 
EU member states 
Declaration of 
independence after 
civil war  
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
partially 
present 
Regional 
security 
Collective 
non-
recognition 
Crimea Full consensus  Strong 
role 
Nordic and Baltic 
EU member states  
Declaration of 
independence after 
Russia¶s aggression 
against Ukraine 
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
absent  
Regional 
security 
Collective 
non-
recognition 
Near and Middle East 
Palestine Partial 
consensus 
Strong 
role 
UK Attempt for 
independence under 
Israeli occupation  
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
partially 
present 
Regional 
security 
Bilateral 
recognition  
Turkish 
Republic of 
Northern 
Cyprus 
(TRNC) 
Full consensus Strong 
role 
Cyprus, Greece 
and UK. 
Declaration of 
independence after 
Turkish invasion  
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
present 
Regional peace 
and security  
Collective 
non-
recognition 
Africa 
Eritrea  Full consensus Weak role  Italy  Declaration of 
independence after 
UN-supervised 
referendum  
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
present 
Regional peace 
and security 
Collective 
recognition 
Western Partial Strong Spain and France Denied right to self- Core Economy Collective 
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Sahara consensus  role  determination Sahrawi 
people after de-
colonisation process 
statehood 
criteria 
absent 
interests and 
regional security 
non-
recognition 
Somaliland Full consensus Strong 
role 
UK Declaration of 
impendence  
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
present 
Economy and 
regional security 
Collective 
non-
recognition 
South Sudan Full consensus Strong 
role 
Non-evident  Declaration of 
independence after 
UN-supervised 
referendum 
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
partially 
present 
Regional peace 
and security 
Collective 
recognition 
Asia 
Taiwan Full consensus Strong 
role 
Non-evident  Contested statehood 
after Chinese 
admission to the UN 
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
absent 
Great Power 
politics and 
regional security  
Collective 
non-
recognition  
East Timor Full consensus  Portugal and 
Ireland 
Declaration of 
independence after 
UN-supervised 
referendum 
Core 
statehood 
criteria 
absent 
Conflict de-
escalation and 
regional security 
Collective 
recognition 
     * (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
     ** (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Kirgizstan, Moldova, Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kirgizstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) 
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